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Response
William G. Moseley
Let me start by noting what a pleasure and inspiring opportunity it 
is to be commenting on the scholarship of Michael Watts. When I 
embarked on my field research for my master’s thesis in the West 
African nation of Mali in 1991, I carried three texts with me into the 
field. These books were Paul Richards’ Indigenous Agricultural Revolu-
tion (1985), Piers Blaikie’s Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing 
Countries (1985), and Michael Watts’ Silent Violence: Food, Famine and 
Peasantry in Northern Nigeria (1983). While the books by Richards and 
Blaikie were fairly compact, Michael Watts’ tome added considerable 
heft to my baggage (so I showed real commitment in lugging it along). 
At the time I was not familiar with geography as a field of study, but 
rather was a student of natural resources management. It was Rich-
ards, Blaikie, and Watts who brought me to geography, and in par-
ticular to an interdisciplinary subfield known as political ecology. Only 
later would I learn in my Ph.D. studies what a pivotal figure Michael 
Watts had been in my chosen discipline and subfield.
My comments today are broken into three parts: 1) an assessment of 
Dr. Watts’ contribution; 2) a critique of a few of his propositions; and 3) 
an extension of where I think one could go with several of the ideas in 
his essay.
*****
Professor Watts has a fairly consistent track record of shaking up the 
conventional thinking in my field. For example, in a 1983 essay entitled 
“On the Poverty of Theory: Natural Hazards Research in Context,” he 
launched a blistering critique of cultural ecology and traditional haz-
ards geography (subfields in geography which had tended to look at 
local environmental management and natural disasters in isolation). 
His insistence that we account for the influence of broader political 
economy on local human-environment interactions ushered in the 
then emerging field of political ecology. Once again, in 1996, Michael 
Watts and his co-author Dick Peet published an edited volume, Lib-
eration Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements, which 
marshaled an outpouring of post-structural political ecology research. 
Given Michael Watts’ track record of rocking the boat, it came as no 
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surprise to me that he used this essay to question a number of promi-
nent ideas regarding oil and development in Nigeria.
By way of summary and synthesis, I believe one of most important 
points we can take away from Michael Watts’ essay is that conflict in 
Nigeria’s delta region is less about oil itself, and more about who has 
the power—the provincial or national government—to divide up the 
proceeds from this resource. To put it in the terms of James Scott’s 
lecture, “Vernaculars Cross-Dressed as Universals: Globalization as 
North Atlantic Hegemony,” this is a struggle between a national scale 
development project (and the interests at that level) and the develop-
ment aspirations and interests of a sub-national region. Oil complicates 
a reconciliation of interests at different scales, but it is not the initial 
cause of the problem. In order to arrive at these conclusions, Watts 
deftly critiques a few of the mainstream interpretations of the situation 
in Nigeria.
First, Dr. Watts argues that the categories we typically use to identify 
different political actors seem to break down in the context of Nigeria. 
We often want to classify armed groups as insurgents or thugs, but 
this distinction is meaningless in the Delta, where they frequently are 
a bit of both. Furthermore, we often think of insurgents as working in 
opposition to the government, but in the Delta certain insurgents are 
funded by different elements of the government. In sum, the typical 
categories do not apply.
Second, Professor Watts questions the unique qualities ascribed to 
oil by Collier (2007) and Ross (2003). Ross suggests that oil cannot be 
looted, yet this is a common occurrence in the Nigerian Delta where 
local people tap or bunker large pipelines. Ross further claims that 
offshore oil cannot be obstructed, yet this happens with regularity in 
the Bight of Benin, where armed groups board platforms and take hos-
tages. Again, the typical categorization does not apply.
Third, Watts critiques a prominent concept in the development lit-
erature, a problem known as the “resource curse,” which suggests 
that the abundance of a particular natural resource often creates more 
problems than benefits for a nation’s political economy. Truth be told, I 
always found the resource curse idea to be refreshing because it served 
as a nice counterbalance to the Malthusian discourse of environmental 
security. Environmental security is a body of literature most closely 
associated with the Canadian political scientist Tad Homer-Dixon, 
which sees resource scarcity—often driven by over-population—as a 
major driver of conflict.1 In my view, the environmental security per-
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spective has led to some preposterous claims and policy prescriptions. 
For example, in July of 2007, a group of geologists at Boston University 
reported that they had discovered a huge underground lake in Sudan. 
They went on to suggest that drilling wells in Sudan would relieve the 
ethnic tension because “much unrest and misery in Darfur is due to 
water shortages.”2
Clearly, just “adding water” will not resolve such a conflict. Crit-
ics of the environmental security approach, including Michael Watts, 
rightly point out that scarcity is often socially constructed, having little 
or nothing to do with population pressure.3 Moreover, conflicts over 
scarce resources are often a symptom (rather than a cause) of underly-
ing tensions, and that resource abundance is just as likely as resource 
scarcity to be the subject of disputes. This is all to say that, in my rush 
to reject the environmental security argument, I perhaps far too eas-
ily accepted the idea of the resource curse. Michael Watts’ essay has 
pushed me to reconsider my perception of the resource curse concept. 
Essentially, his critique of this idea resembles some facets of the one 
that has been leveled against environmental security, i.e., conflicts over 
resources are often a symptom (rather than a cause) of underlying ten-
sions.
*****
I have two minor quibbles with Michael Watts’ essay. First, I would 
argue that he uses a conception of the resource curse idea that is overly 
narrow. He borrows this particular conception from Collier who sees 
it as “dependence upon primary commodity exports…substantially 
increasing the risk of civil war.”4 In addition to the civil unrest aspect of 
the resource curse, many also identify a second dimension, sometimes 
known as “Dutch Disease,” which focuses on the simplification of a 
national economy that may occur because of over-reliance on a small 
set of commodity exports.5 As an illustration, Nigeria used to have one 
of the more dynamic manufacturing sectors in West Africa. It was also 
largely self-sufficient in food production. However, as the oil industry 
grew more prominent, both manufacturing and agriculture atrophied.6 
Common explanations of this second dimension tend to focus on the 
decisions within a government or national economy that lead to this 
problem. More specifically, the argument is that there is a tendency 
in government and the business sector to gravitate to the easy money 
rather than investing in other sectors of the economy.
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When we broaden our conception of the resource curse idea to 
include the simplification of national economies, it becomes strikingly 
apparent that we often ignore the external dimension of this problem. 
Focusing on the external dimensions of the resource curse problem 
forces us to examine the external structures that have led a country 
to concentrate on the export of a certain commodity and ask why a 
place cannot seem to diversify beyond this particular product. In other 
words, in many instances there is an external as well as an internal side 
to a country’s over-reliance on one or two exports, and we need to 
be thinking about both dimensions. In my own research, one of the 
phenomena I study is export-oriented cotton production in the West 
African nation of Mali.7 Mali has been the leading cotton producer in 
sub-Saharan Africa in recent years. This, unfortunately, is also one of 
Mali’s few exports, accounting for a massive share of foreign exchange 
and 30–50% of government revenues. However, it is no accident that 
Mali produces cotton for the external market. It was introduced during 
the colonial period (as it was in northern Nigeria), and farmers were 
encouraged to grow it in order to pay head taxes.8 During the 1980s 
and 1990s, World Bank-imposed structural adjustment policies fur-
ther led Mali to obsessively focus on its export orientation, namely, to 
emphasize cotton production. In sum, I believe Watts’ use of Collier’s 
narrow conception of the resource curse problem leads us to overly 
focus on the internal dynamics of this issue.
Now let me outline my second minor concern with the essay. Profes-
sor Watts is very good at making us leery of commodity determinism, 
specifically, imbuing oil with special transformative power. I agree 
that oil has no innate powers. It was just black stuff in the ground a 
few hundred years ago. It was only after humans discovered a use for 
oil that it became a so-called natural resource. We could say the same 
for many other natural resources that we dig up out of the ground in 
Africa, including gold, diamonds and copper. All were useless until we 
created an application or desire for them. In some instances, such as 
the case of diamonds, humans not only created a desire for them but 
went to great lengths to insure that they would be scarce and therefore 
expensive.9 In his essay, Michael Watts is effective at deconstructing the 
commodity determinism surrounding oil. As discussed earlier, none of 
the so-called unique qualities of oil described by Collier and Ross seem 
to hold in Nigeria. However, I wonder if oil is not different because it 
is the lubricant, or primary energy source, of modern industrial societ-
ies? Put slightly differently, and relating to my last point, most resource 
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extraction efforts have a specific dynamic within the country, as well 
as a life and meaning outside of the country. We can think about the 
dynamics of oil production in Nigeria; its geography, how its revenues 
are shared, and whether it may be looted or its production obstructed. 
But examining the head of the camel inside of the tent can only take us 
so far. I would argue that it is the rest of the animal, outside of the tent, 
at this particular point in history, that may make oil somewhat unique. 
As Watts notes, “In the long march toward the modern world system, 
mass commodities of various sorts…have been its beasts of burden.” In 
the early to mid-20th century, a constellation of interests in the United 
States (the oil complex) emerged to engineer a petroleum-based form 
of development.10 This system prospered and grew to the point where 
it became the ubiquitous form of development around the world. Oil, 
therefore, may have special powers, not because of its particular quali-
ties and the way its extraction is organized within Nigeria, but because 
of its use and meaning within the larger global economy.
*****
My final comments have to do with how I would like to extend this 
essay. Put differently, if we were guitar players and this were a jam 
session, this is how I would riff off the piece Michael Watts has just 
played. I would like to extend his essay in two ways.
First, what are the implications of this detailed case study of the sit-
uation in Nigeria for other countries that are dependent on the export 
of one or two primary commodities? This is important as a large chunk 
of Collier’s “bottom billion” live within the context of a national econ-
omy that could be characterized as such. To use Andre Gunder Frank’s 
terminology, these are economies that were underdeveloped during 
the colonial period by being made to produce a few commodities for 
the core, today’s Global North.11 In many cases, this orientation has 
only been reinforced by the policies of global financial institutions like 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).12 Conse-
quently, I would argue that we need to consider development alterna-
tives for economies that are dependent on the export of one or two 
primary commodities. I can think of at least two possibilities (although 
I am sure there are many others): a) a trust fund approach and b) a 
return to policies of import substitution.
The trust fund approach has been tried in a few countries, both less 
and more developed. A good example of a less-developed nation that 
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has pursued this approach is the Micronesian island state of Kiribati. 
With a population of 90,000 people spread over 34 islands, Kiribati 
had a per capita income in 2004 of $950. While most of the population 
(80%) is engaged in a subsistence-based farming and fishing economy, 
the country also has significant phosphate deposits, which it is min-
ing and exporting. Since 1956, the proceeds from phosphate extrac-
tion have been placed in a trust fund that is invested off shore by two 
London-based account managers.13 The returns on this fund are used 
to finance government services, including healthcare and the develop-
ment of a communication and transportation infrastructure between 
the islands. What this means is that most residents in Kiribati are free 
to continue living a subsistence lifestyle, yet still have access to sustain-
ably financed government services. A similar situation has occurred in 
Norway (a developed country example) in which proceeds from the 
natural gas industry have been placed in a trust fund that subsidizes 
government service provision.14 Both cases represent situations where 
non-renewable resources (phosphate and natural gas) have effectively 
been converted to a renewable resource (a self-sustaining trust fund) 
which provides for ongoing investments in a country’s human capital.
According to influential policy reports in the early 1980s, African 
policies of import substitution were tried and largely failed in the 
1960s.15 However, my sense is that we need to revisit these attempts 
and begin experimenting with them again (a view shared by a small 
but growing number of economists16). By import substitution, I am 
referring to state-led attempts to diversify the local economy and build 
up local manufacturing so that a country wouldn’t have to import all 
of its goods and could break out of a cycle of dependency. Perhaps we 
could even have such policies supported by the international financial 
institutions, a sort of reverse structural adjustment (an idea that doesn’t 
seem so wild after hearing Ravi Kanbur speak on “The Co-Evolution 
of the Washington Consensus and the Economic Development Dis-
course”). While I could perhaps imagine this happening in a place like 
Mali, which is overly dependent on cotton production, I struggle to see 
it occurring in a place that produces oil because of the enormous exter-
nal pressure to keep producing this commodity. This leads me to my 
second and final extension, or riff, on Michael Watts’ article.
If we think about the tensions between globalization and develop-
ment in various parts of the world, I would argue that the oil complex 
is a beast with many heads. We see one face of this hydra in Nigeria 
and yet another in the United States. The connective tissue of this 
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animal is a group of oil companies that operate around the world. A 
petroleum-based form of development emerged in the United States in 
the 20th century. We built spatially diffuse suburbs, fueled by federally 
backed housing loans for largely white middle-class families.17 The 
government invested massively in a specific form of transportation 
infrastructure, the federal highway system, which fueled auto-based 
inter-urban travel. Because of ring roads around cities, it also facilitated 
an increasingly diffuse urban form. The government and petroleum-
related interests, such as auto companies, then largely dismantled pub-
lic transportation in all but the largest American cities through buyouts 
and unfavorable subsidy structures.18 While one could plausibly argue 
in the 1950s that, as the saying goes, what was good for General Motors 
was good for America, the same cannot be said for oil companies.
Cheap oil was like a new drug being introduced on the market. It 
is said that people initially turn to drugs to escape an uncomfortable 
reality. Protracted drug use then changes human biochemistry in a 
way that leaves the user craving more. I am not an expert on the social 
pathologies that initially led us to turn to cheap oil, but it seems that 
a solid argument could be made for racism as at least one casual fac-
tor (in the sense that it is a repelling force that works against people 
living and travelling together). Whatever the initial cause, cheap oil, 
like an addictive drug, did change the basic spatial form of our soci-
ety to the point where Americans feel they cannot survive without 
this commodity. We now have an urban form characterized by dis-
persed low-density suburbs, large roads, limited sidewalks, and little 
to no public transportation. Most Americans literally cannot function 
without access to cheap gasoline. This addiction has had grave conse-
quences for us and the rest of the globe.
Yet we have been in crises before and were able to change. Eigh-
teenth and 19th-century America was built on another form of cheap 
energy, human slavery. The trafficking in African lives of two centuries 
ago had devastating consequences for the African continent and it led 
to a perverse and unsustainable form of development in the United 
States. We are still living with the legacy of this era. Just as some 
contemporary politicians defend the American way of life (code for 
U.S. car culture), many 19th-century American politicians defended 
human slavery as part of the southern way of life. Then, for a variety 
of reasons—perhaps most importantly the changing economics of slav-
ery—we changed, adopting an increasing sense of basic human rights 
and our common humanity as well as a growing public awareness of 
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the consequences of slavery in Africa. The change was not pretty, a 
brutal civil war was fought, and we have never adequately dealt with 
the legacies of this system. But we did change, and we now have our 
first African-American president.
We are now at another pivotal moment in history when we have an 
opportunity to change. There is an increasing public awareness of the 
environmental and social consequences of our addiction to oil. While 
global warming was once considered a dubious concern of “crackpot 
scientists” and left-wing ranters, it is now increasingly perceived as a 
real problem by the American public.19 While less widely understood, I 
also believe that the American public increasingly appreciates the con-
sequences of oil addiction vis-à-vis security issues and development in 
oil-producing states. Far more important, however, are the changing 
economics of petroleum. The high cost of energy, when combined with 
rising environmental and social awareness, is a potent combination for 
change. We have an opportunity. We have a choice. We can continue 
our addiction to oil, to spew ever-increasing carbon emissions, to fos-
ter the not-so-benevolent agency of oil companies in other parts of the 
world, and to fight a global war on terror, which is not unrelated to 
our oil addiction. Or we can change the way we produce energy, the 
way we organize ourselves spatially, the way we relate to each other, 
and the way we move from one place to another. These are profound 
changes and they will not be easy. However, as we develop at home 
(and I very much view such changes as development), we will begin 
to change our relationships with the rest of the world, and reduce the 
burdens of our pathological behavior. I have always resisted the false 
dichotomy of development at home versus abroad. If you take away 
anything from this Roundtable, I hope it is an understanding that our 
development and development in other parts of the world are inextri-
cably linked.
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